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'...it is a characteristic of empires that they turn their victims 
into their defenders.' (E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire/ p.266)
The vise of indigenous peoples for military purposes was common to most 
imperialist powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Indian 
subcontinent had been a proving ground for this policy in the eighteenth century 
when both the British and French East India Companies had deployed sepoys to 
overcome the Indian principalities, to fight alongside European units in their 
struggle for supremacy and then, in the case of Britain, to police the vast 
region.
The problem of providing sufficient white manpower to extend and police 
the British Empire was a chronic one, and 'native' manpower was the obvious 
answer, the concomitant of the exploitation of potentially vast quantities 
of cheap labour in the commercial sphere. The perils of this policy for the 
maintenance of British supremacy and the problem of 'policing the policemen' 
were made bloodily clear in the Indian Mutiny. Despite this setback to the 
policy of using native levies the principle nonetheless remained intact. 
Indigenous troops were used throughout the Empire, including Africa, as in 
the Zulu War, the campaigns in Egypt and the Sudan in the 1880s and 1890s and 
in East Africa and Nyasaland in the 1890s. In the latter case the disparate 
territorial units which came to make up the King's African Rifles in the early 
1900s were first formed in the 1890s to aid in the imposition and consolidation 
of colonial rule ..
In Southern Rhodesia the employment of African troops by Europeans 
dated back to the conquest period of the 1890s. In the Anglo-Ndebele ' Jar 
of 1893 Africans fought alongside the settler forces, either directly under 
their control as auxiliaries or as independently formed units under their 
pre-colonial leaders and organisation, operating as allies. 1 Similarly, in 
the risings of 1896-7 African forces played a minor role in the suppression 
of the insurrections, both as allies _of the British South Africa Company forces2 
and as members of the Native Police.3
The role of these forces in the establishment and consolidation: of 
settler dominance is a sensitive ane in the historiography of Rhatesia/Zijnbafcwe. 
The use of the term 'collaborators' to describe these people, even if tech­
nically correct, is an Unfortunate one^ as it projects on to than late twentieth 
century experiences and concepts which have overlaid the strict definition of 
the word. The motives of the allied polities had more to do with local and
traditional power politics than with theJes!tablishment and maintenance of white 
supremacy.5 That in the long run these people could be said to have made an
unfortunate or unwise choice'is irrelevant'when their nineteehth century 
perspective is considered. To thorn the European settlers would have appeared 
as merely another intrusive group, albeit somewhat different and more powerful 
than in the past, of which there had been numerous in the distant past and 
some within living memory.6 The Europeans would have been, seen as another 
factor to be considered and used in the constantly shifting power structure 
of the region. The long-term implications, of co-operation with the Company 
forces could not have been crystal clear, if at all apparent, at the time.
This issue is of seme importance in analysing African troops in the 
Southern Rhodesian armed forces in the twentieth century. The motives of 
Africans in aiding the B.S.A. Company during the imposition of colonial rule 
are relatively clear, but once the political, social and economic structure 
of Rhodesia had been laid down the motives of those who joined the Rhodesian 
armed forces become less easily explicable. At first sight it appears 
anomalous that people who were disadvantaged in the civilian world by the 
settler power structure and who were also discriminated against within the 
armed forces in terms of pay, conditions of service and promotion, should 
voluntarily serve in the forces which maintained this system. The major 
purpose of this paper is to explore why Africans behaved in this way and to 
take a few first steps in explaining the apparent contradictidn of the'African 
volunteer serviceman. ;; w :
A secondary purpose is to explain why the white governments in-both 
the period of Company rule and under self-government employed Africans troops T 
The answer is not as straightforward as it would appear, for the events of the 
, 1890s had profoundly affected white thinking on a variety of matters, of which 
defence was one. The risings of 189677 made it clear that a large part Of 
the African population was disaffected and that control was regained and main­
tained only through force,,of arms. The spectre of another series ofrisings 
permeated defence planning until the 1930s,and even into the 1940s, the risings 
had,an influence, 7 .after which the emergence of African nationalism regenerated 
the fear with a different ccmplead.on. , The experience of the risings made 
the "raising of African troops psychologically difficult for the settlers, the 
B.S.A. Company and subsequently the governments of the self -governing colony. 
They all feared that arming and training Afrigan troops would create a 
'Trojan horse' which could form the core of local pr nation-wide risings;
This fear was not built wholly on the extravagant imaginings of anxious white 
minds, for the defection of large numbers of the Native Politer in 1896 was 
a concrete case for those who were suspicious of the concept of arming and 
training indigenous Africans.3 The failure of the B.S.A. Company to raise 
African levies for service in the Boer War was not a product of neglect,, but 
of a conscious policy originating, among other factors, in vivid memories of 
events a few years previously.^
Until the First World War the question pf recruiting Africans vfor 
military units did not arise as a significant issue. Despite the vicissitudes 
of the 18$0s Africans were still an important element in the British South* « 
Africa Police; in 1913 there were 600 African policemen in a total of 1150.
As the B.S.A.P, was de. facto the first line of defence for the territory 
Africans played an important role in its internal security. Butt the risings 
still exerted a tremendous influence on their training and equipments The 
: sight of African policeman .training with firearms in Bulawayo in 
hysterical outbrnsts,-from ,settlers, .forcing the Company to restrict the
2 -
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use of firearms to Europeans and 150 Ngcni 'scouts'. The indigenous police 
were armed with knobkerries. ^
The 'problem' of raising African troops for the armed forces had to be 
squarely confronted in the First World. War. Despite the large preportion of 
the white population which went to the battle fronts, or served in internal 
security units, the manpower needs of the East African front exceeded the , 
capacity of the white caimunity to supply them.
Africans were eirployed in limited numbers in a non-combatant role from 
1915 both within Rhodesia and in East Africa. i2 As the v/ar progressed the 
logistics system for the war effort required ever larger numbers of carriers, 
but the vast majority of these webe recruited froh outside Southern Rhodesia. 13 
in 1915 thirty African '.scouts' were recruited for service with the all-white 
2nd Rhodesia Regiment in German East Africa. 14 .
But while African recruits were eagerly sought after elsewhere in Africa 
the issue of Riming large numbers of African^ and trailing* thCra in modem 
warfare was not finally confronted in' Southern Rhodesia until 1916. By then 
it was clear that the ability of the white-population to sustain singlehand^dly 
the combat effort was rapidly diminishing. However, it is evident? that' 
given the general labour shortage which prevailed before and during the First 
World War eyen the African manpower sector would be difficult to tap.' The 
possible consequence of disrupting the settler econaty by competing for,, scarce 
labour had to be considered by the Administration. In 1917 Chaplin,, the Admin­
istrator, wrote of the difficult manpower situation which had already arisen 
by 5.916:
I am afraid we have about come to the end of the men whan 
we can send to the war from this Territory. We. shall be 
able to raise another native contingent , and we'imay get a 
platoon or two far the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment, but that is 
shout all. We must keep the mines going and retain ade­
quate protection, or something like it, to deal with any 
possible local trouble.15
Despite the 'risings psychosis' there was, surprisingly, no great,oppo­
sition to the formation of an African regiment, probably because their numbers 
were to be strictly limited. Refcruitment took place against a background of 
South African disapproval of employing Africans in a ccnbatant role,"> hjut 
within Southern Rhodesia there was general acquiescence. There .were allusions 
to 'opposition in some quarters' in official correspondence an the raising Of 
the jeegiment,!? but this was muted and not publicly discussed. " Sir Lewis 
Liichell, One of the B.S.A. Company directors, wrote: 'I am surprised that 
while its cost and feasibility have been discussed by the Board no-one has 
questioned its policy. For my part_I dislike the idea of arming and drilling 
so warlike a tribe /i.e. the Ndebele/ . ,18 Although ftLchell may have been 
articulating what many of the settlers thought, the exigencies of. the military 
situation over-rode any forebodings as to the wisdan of creating a 'Trojan. . 
horse' of future rebellion.
There was seme delay in raising the Rhodesia Native Regiment. This; 
arose, not frem any opposition, but. from B.S.A. Conpany foot-dragging while. ., 
the vexed question of responsibility for war expenditure was still unresolved.
Sy 1916 the (bapany was no longer prepared to raise, units on
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as it had done with the 1st and 2nd Rhodesia Regiments, until it was clear, 
that the Imperial authorities would pay. for them. 1.9 When the War Office,
undertook to cover expenditure on the Rhodesia Native Regiment the Company 
moved quickly to recruit the unit. The original plan had been to raise 
five hundred 'native police' to reinforce the hard-pressed Rhodesia-Nyasfiland 
Eield Force in1 East Africa. 20 Their role was to have been essentially that
of general protective duties. It had been hoped to raise these paramilitary 
police from tribes north of the Zambezi, specifically the Bomba and the, ; - 
Ngoni, but the physique and general quality of those who came forward was 
not considered adequate for a combatant role.21 In.,any event recruitment
of Africans for the war effort had become difficult in (torthern Rhodesia i ; 
for a number of reasons.22 in raising a unit of foreign Africans the 
Company hoped to avoid the possible post-war problem of a trained bo«fy of 
indigenous veterans forming the core of a resistance movement. This attempt 
to recruit 'aliens' rather than indigenous Africans is a recurrent theme in 
Southern Rhodesian defence policy. In the late 1890s the Mashonaland Native 
Police was formed with recruits who came only from north of the Zambezi.
In the face of these difficulties plans were modified to raise 
a force of five hundred Ndebele, this tribal group having a reputatio%for 
being warlike among whites, based on their experiences of the 1890s. ;C:$^l e 
it was being raised the regiment was labelled the 'Matabele Regiment* end 
this designation persisted for seme months even though, recruits were obtained 
from other tribes from both within and outside Rhodesia. 23 , .In the eyes of 
the Administration and its recruiters the non-Ndebele peoples of Southern 
Rhodesia were poor material for canbat. This myth, of Shoma pusillanimity 
was again a throwover f rah white perceptions of thenineteenth century 
history of the region,24 and was largely responsible for the planned initial 
focus of the recruiting campaign on the Ndebele.
The Native Dd^artment was given the major responsibility of 
recruiting the regiment, it being considered to have the most efficient 
apparatus for the purpose.25 once plans for recruiting,wer$ set in train 
it was decided that the recruiting net should be wider. Consequently re­
cruiting drives encompassed other tribal groups in Rhodesia and 'alien natives 
resident in Southern Rhodesia. Veterans of the King's African Rifles-were 
particularly sought after.26 By the time the second drfve for recruits, 
for a second battalion for the regiment, began in 1917 'alien natives' were^ 
particularly sought after. They Were considered more warlike than Southern. 
JSanbezian peoples, and of course their local loyalties would not be highly . 
developed# thereby reducing their potential as a source of assistance toi;tK. 
any future insurrectionary force arising in Southern Rhodesia.?? o oi
’ ■ . . . : • ' • • : i : 1
Curiously, the response5 df Africans to the recruiting campaign 
seamed to underscore official convictions of Shona pusillanimity and Ndebele 
pugnacity. At the end. of the first f©pnjiting ciampaign the Ch^Lef Natiye-^ui 
> Ccmmissioner reported that the Native pepananent had secured . 428 of the. SpCl 
recruits required, 'the Matabele being represented by over 300V. . , He addfed:;;
. that recruiting was halted at a time when the Ndebele were volunteering in 
rapidly increasing numbers.'2® The appendix to this paper discusses .the -<Cfi 
distribution by district of recruits for the R.N.R. obtained in l9l6. There 
was a striking imbalance in favour of Matabeleland with a concentration in 
a few districts, In addition, of those non-Ndebele recruits obtained a . "
large preportion were 'alien natives', that is labour migrants' .from outsider- 
.Southern Rhodesia. By 1918, General of,, the SouthernIhoclesian
•forces reported# the proportion of 'aliens' to indigenous Africans in the
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R.N.R. was three to one, indicating a major shift away from indigenous 
, flfridansjas a source of recruits.
';!'-,/fii'bdth 1916, when the 1st R.N.IL was being formed, and in 1917, 
^When^the 2nd R.N.R. was raised, the noA Ndebele indigenous peoples of'Southern 
Rhodesia were largely apathetic to calls to volunteer, and in some cases 
resisted recruitment, albeit passively. In Mashonaland the response to the 
1916 drive was very poor, except for the Salisbury and Charter districts 
which produced 56 recruits between them. 30 While there is no direbt evidence
to show that recruiters used force or overt threats in recruiting, it is 
Clear that Africans in seme Mashonaland districts felt that they were being 
heavily pressured to volunteer. In Charter there is evidence to suggest 
(but not to confirm) that in 1917 strong persuasive tactics may have been 
used. 31 Whether these pressures were real or imagined on the part of Africans 
is often difficult to establish from official correspondence, but in Mashona- 
land they responded as if they were going to be conscripted. Large matters 
of young males slept in the bush at night to avoid anticipated conscription 
raids and many absconded fran their districts.32 There is a pathetic 
incident showing African fears in the Hartley district where the chiefs 
offered £30 to the Administration to buy exenption from recruiting for their 
people.33 The chiefs, as so often in Southern Rhodesian history, were in an 
invidious position, for they were used by the Administration to persuade their 
peoples to volunteer. In Matabeieland many Chiefs seemed to co-operate 
readily with the Native Department, but in Mashonaland they were keenly aware 
of the conflicting expectations of the Administration and of their people. 34 
This was reinforced by expressions of displeasure by the Native Department 
when the chiefs failed to find recruits.3* in 1917 the response was even 
poorer in Mashonaland? only fifteen Africans from that region responded to 
the initial drive for recruits for the 2nd R.N.R. This was taken as evidence 
by the Native Department that force was not being used to bring in recruits 
for the regiment■s two battalions.36
The recruiting canpaign in the Eastern Districts in 1916 was disastrous 
(see Appendix). There the number of recruits was negligible though the 
Superintendent of Natives for the tin tali Circle had entertained hopes of at 
least fifty recruits from his administrative area.3' In the south-east of 
the country the response was virtually non-existent.3°
It would be adventurous, given the evidence available, to see the 
poverty of the response to the recruiting drives as an articulated African 
nationalist phenomenon within a Rangerian framework. There is evidence to 
show that there was political agitation against recruiting by Africans, but 
this was on a minute scale and was centred in Matabeieland, the area in which 
recruiting was most successful.39 The African response was clearly a 
spontaneous movement against a specific settler initiative, albeit against 
a wider background of alienation frcm the regime. The evidence available 
would also suggest that responses were shaped by specifically regional 
experiences. The reasons for which Africans resisted recruitment or 
enlisted in the regiment varied widely according to local conditions and 
■ recent history. For example, in the Ndanga and Melsetter districts, where 
; no recruits were obtained in 1916, there was a background of organised 
passive resistance to payment of tax in the pre-war years. 40 This would 
have made it very difficult for the Native Department, responsible fpr tax 
collection, to operate effectively as a recruiting agent for the armed forces.
• ■ 29
The Native Department correspondence on recruitment does not blame 
political opposition for the apathy to recruitment in Mashonaland. Rather
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the Native Department saw the major reason behind the negative response 
as the lack of warlike virtues in those approached. Cliches about idle­
ness and cowardice were bandied about by Native Department officials, 41 -
and there was little surprise (although there was disappointment) at the regional 
.pattern which emerged fran the recruiting campaign. In seme districts the 
Shota people themselves went to great lengths to reinforce these impressions, 
readily admitting to their lack of warlike virtues and refusing to he shamedinto service.42
Fear was clearly at the root of the African response outside Matabele- 
land and in those parts of Matabeleland where it was also poor. The 
behaviour of young males was reminiscent of their response to forced labour 
drives in the 1890s. During both the First and Second World Wars it is 
evident that Africans feared that they would be conscripted and that if they 
volunteered they would be used for purposes other than those stated to them 
by recruiters. 44 There was a deep mistrust of what they were told by 
officials, no doubt fuelled by the labour history of previous decades. In 
any event they had no real reason to trust the officials who sought to 
enlist than into the armed forces.
A second fear was that of being sent abroad. The case of,recruiting 
in the Melsetter district is particularly illuminating in this respect.
There thirty potential recruits appeared before the Assistant Native 
Ocrattissioner, but when they heard that they would have to fight in German 
East Africa they demurred. The Assistant Native Ccnndssioner wrote: 'The 
martial spirit of these men was not sufficient to induce them to go so far 
from their homes in search of glory and after they had heard their destination 
they all found that they had urgent affairs requiring their presence at their 
hones.'45 The recruiting drive in ffelsetter produced no recruits. It is
not clear whether their fears of German East Africa were based on the reports 
of anti-British and pro-German elements in the area4® or on fear of the 
unknown, but in this instance the major consideration of the recruits was 
.....the destination. A similar type of response was reported for the Inyanga 
and Kusape districts.4? A further factor influencing recruitment was a 
lack of information and understanding by Africans as to the nature of the 
First World War. There was no immediate threat to Southern Rhodesia 
throughout the war and Africans naturally tended to see the conflict as a 
remote white man's war which did not concern them.4® ' There was no 
readily apparent, compelling reason for Africans to fight Germans. To 
many Africans the war sirrpiy meant a seemingly inexplicable rise in prices.
The remoteness of the conflict and its battle zones had other side effects. 
During the recruiting drive of 1917 for the 2nd R.N.R. many Africans were 
convinced that the 1st R.N.R, had been annihilated. Reports of deaths • 
fran German East Africa and the fact that the first battalion had not returned 
confirmed suspicions. Rumours were rife in many districts that the Germans 
were beating the British and that they would soon arrive in Southern 
Rhodesia to replace the Company regime. Abstaining from the conflict may 
have been a display of prudence.49
The motives of those who joined the two battalions of the R.N.R. 
are perhaps less clear than the motives of those who did not. There are 
no extant diaries or reminiscences of Africans who served in the R.N.R., 
mpet of whom were illiterate.50 The collection of oral evidence, along 
p ipe lines of M.E. Page's studies of Nyasaland in the First World War,^1 
is clearly a priority for the future, but political and military conditions 
within Rhodesia at present render such a project all but impossible.
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• .p,-£solid .body of ,-^ dQqurri^ t^  ^evidence on this-problem dees: not.^ist/ 
but-some., insights pan be gleaned frcrrl the fragments availably It 
apparent that there was a wide gulf between whites' raotives for serving .arid 
those of Africans who joined up. I hile-the more public official documents 
and-press reports spoke of African 'loyalty' in responding to the call, to t 
ai3ns,52 it is unlikely that the majority of Africans volunteered from feel­
ings of commitment to the B.S.A. Company or the Cram. !hites volunteered 
frcm feelings of patriotism and under, moral pressure from the white 
community, but patriotic resolutions, spontaneous volunteering and the , 
multitude of manifestations of a positive emotional or spiritual commitment 
to the British cause are not evident in Southern Rhodesian Africans. Con­
tributions to the National Jar Funds are perhaps sane baraneter of African 
feelings ta/ards the war,53 but these were small compared to those of the 
white community and. may have been of the nature of the Hartley chiefs' £30 - 
an attenpt to buy off the Administration. Certainly in sane cases a monetary 
contribution was considered enough. Payr’ent of cash, i.e. taxes, fines 
and dipping fees, was traditionally and obviously a way of remaining in favour 
with the settler government - this seemed to be all that was required of 
Africans in the way of 'civic duties' by the Administration.
Seme of the recruits appear to have been impressed into service, 
not in the tradition of the naval press gang or forced labour of the 1890s, 
but through more subtle and less obvious pressures. I-any were pressured by 
their chiefs, themselves under pressure from the Native Department to perform 
well and, forward as many recruits as possible.54 Native Department officials
would also appear to have been under pressure, or felt themselves to be, to 
perform satisfactorily; they were eager to sha; their competence by forward- 
ing large batches of recruits. Poor recruiting figures were felt to be 
an adverse reflection of the district administration, of the Native Ccmmiss" 
loner's 'grip.' on the district.55 There, vere cases: of strong persuasive 
tactics being used by chiefs, which did produce recruits.56 Although the
Administration denied us .ing any pressure whatsoever, there were allegations 
about the exertion of undue influence levelled at the Native Department.^ 
However, frcm the evidence available it vrould be fair to say that, despite 
abuses and the use of a wide variety of indirect pressures , the bulk of the 
recruits were genuine volunteers and not forced levies. The Company would 
have been aware that after the publicity and investigations following the 
.. 1896-7 risings it could not easily lose force. Certainly the type and scale 
of abuses and upheavals which accarpenied recruiting elsewhere in Africa 
did not exist to anything like that extent in Southern Rhodesia.58
In the case of the Mdebele strong appeals were made to the warrior 
traditions of that people by recruiters.59 This appeal to warrior machismo 
operated on individual and group levels. Individuals came forward in res­
ponse to appeals to uphold the warrior tradition and there v;as ccnpetition 
between different intre-tribal groups. The numbers, gent forward to the 
R.N.R. were considered a reflection on the manliness or ca-zardioe of groups 
of people, stimulating chiefs to pressure males into signing up.60 This 
,.r§ort of appeal was clearly effective in sane documented cases, but evidence 
is not wide enough to allav any firm ccnclusions as to its responsibility 
rx.,for inducing the bulk of recruits to join. ; •
, Service in the R.N.R. was one of a range of economic.opportunities 
open to Africans in Southern Rhodesia. There are indications that. economic 
motives and experiences were predominant in seme of the colony's; districts. 
Recruiting was most successful among those who had a 'tradition' of labour 
. migration. Natabeleland, particularly the Bulalima-Mangwe district, was
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an area from which there had been considerable labour migration south of the 
Limpopo, especially to Johannesburg. 61 Similarly the good response from
'aliens' would indicate that-those'who had made long journeys in search of 
work were less fearful of joining up for service vhich would entail a move g2 
to Salisbury for training and beyond Southern Rhodesia's borders for combat.
The previously mentioned reaction of the potential recruits from the Itelsetter 
region would seen to reinforce this observation. The Native Department 
appeared to bear this in mind in its recruiting, for in the campaign to raise 
2nd R.N.R. permission was sought fran the Chamber of Mines to recruit firm 
those already enplcyed 6n mines; that is, from people who had already taken 
the leap into the labour market and labour migration.63 in this way seventy
recruits were Obtained from the Falocn Mine alone.64
However, there must be a note of caution here. Evidence would 
indicate that economic motives and pressures -and a past: history of labour 
migration were not enough to over-ride other prejudices against signing on 
with the R.N.R. For example, in the Victoria District, from vhich labour 
did migrate southwards and which was suffering drought conditions in 1916 
and 1917, very few Africans joined the services.65 clearly motivations
operated in a complex manner.
Wages and conditions of service were roughly comparable to those 
obtainable in the civil sector. Privates were paid 25/~ a month, 10/- of 
that paid monthly, the remaining 15/- being deferred pay paid out as a lump 
sun ai termination of service.6® Rations, quarters and uniforms were provided 
free. As far as labour contracts vent in Southern Rhodesia at that time 
that covering service in the forces was not untypical. Certainly, for an 
indigenous African wishing or having to enter the labour market or wanting to 
change employment service with the R.N.R. would not be an especially unattract­
ive option compared with, say, mining. For 'alien natives' the problem is 
somewhat different. Van Onselen has shewn that they were generally paid 
higher wages than Shona or Ndebele labourers so that for them the material 
attractions of service in the R.N.R. would be minimized.67 The fact that 
large numbers of ' aliens' were recruited from mines may indicate that the 
'push' of appalling conditions of service in mining over-rode the minimal 
'puli' of the material benefits of military service. During the war wage 
rates generally declined while prices generally rose, putting a double squeeze 
on real incomes, and this may have made service in the R.N.R. more attractive. 
It is important to note, however, that recruiting took place against a 
background of general labour shortage,68 so that the R.N.R. cannot be 
. .characterised as the last resort of the desperately unemployed. rhile 
economic motives may have been dominant for seme individuals and may have 
been important in some districts as a whole, it is not possible to pinpoint 
the need or desire to earn money as the major factor prompting volunteers.
Hie R.N.R., not surprisingly considering the settlers' and Admin­
istration's attitudes towards it, was demobilised very soon after hostilities 
ceased. Hie value of the regiment's service in German East Africa was 
widely acclaimed, but the pre-war reservations about the existence of a body 
of trained Africans in Southern Rhodesia quickly surfaced again. Africans 
were not called on to participate in the schemes of defence for Southern Rhod­
esia devised in the inter-war period, and the 1926 Defence Act, introducing 
selective compulsory service for the first time, excluded Africans from its 
provisions. There was same vague discussion of the possibility of raising 
' a regular battalion of 'alien' natives to take the burden of providing the 
first line of defence off the British South Africa Police.6 HrLs came to 
nothing, although forty Ngcni 'scouts' were oart of the permanent establishment 
of the B.S.A.P.70
9The African responses to recruiting drives during the Second World 
War were broadly similar in nature to those of the First World War. In 
looking at the raising of African troops in Southern Rhodesia between 1941 . 
and 1945 the official documentary data available is considerably more 
Sketchy than that available for the First world War; To date the files
of the Ministry of Defence for this period are not available at the National 
Archives of Rhodesia. Material has therefore to be gleaned from more 
obscure sources.71
The decision to raise or resurrect African units was taken in 1940 
as a result of an Eirpire-wide effort to find new sources of manpower for 
the growing global conflict. In Jifrica this became an official 'Africanisation' 
programme/ '2 the initial aim of which was, in Southern Rhodesia, to train 
Africans for non-combatant roles to relieve Europeans for combat. The 
attractiveness of the scheme was obvious the Empire had vast reserves of 
non-white manpower, and they had proved their military usefulness during 
the First World War. All that was required to exploit them for the war 
effort was the political will. The raising of non-white troops was certainly 
less expensive than raising white troops, for the former's lower civilian 
standard of living was reflected in a lower military standard of living.^2 
There was a great deal of enthusiasm for the scheme at the outset, which was, 
in the case of Southern Rhodesia, to be found to be misplaced. By 1943 
it was realized that AfricanisatiOn was not going to be the answer to the , 
manpower problem in the colony. This was explicitly stated in the annual 
report of the Secretary for Defence for 1943:
The establishment for the Battalion /the Rhodesian 
African Rifles/, together with first line reinforcements, 
proved to be a very heavy one, and in order that the unit 
should proceed at full strength, the policy of Africanis • 
ation referred to in the last annual report had to be 
reversed...
In order that future reinforcements to the R.A.R. 
should be ensured, arrangements were made to stimulate 
African recruiting, and an important step in this direction 
was the opening of the R.A.R. Depot in Matabeleland. %  
the provision of this depot it was hoped that the Matabele 
would be more easily induced to cane forward for military 
service. Towards the end of the year there were indi­
cations that African recruiting, which had previously 
been somewhat disappointing was definitely improved.
Later in the war the Commander, Military Forces, wrote:
The term. 'Africanisation' seems to be generally held 
to be the panacea for all our problems. Nothing could be 
more dangerous as it is essential in my opinion to preserve 
a fair balance between European and Native troops in the 
Colony...
Native recruiting for the military forces is at a low 
ebb and to raise two additional African Infantry Battalions 
1 at the present rate of recruiting will take two years.^5
This statement neatly illustrates the twin problems of raising African troops 
in Southern Rhodesia • - European reluctance to raise large numbers of African 
troops* and African reluctance to join up.
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\ It was suggested earlier in this paper that the apathy of Africans 
towards 'calls tothe colours' in the First T tor Id War was not positively 
African nationalist in content. This cannot be said to be the case for 
the Second World liar. There is evidence that much resistance to recruiting 
was, more consciously political in content and that many Africans were more 
politically informed in their decisions not to join the Rhodesian African 
Rifles or Rhodesian Air Askari Corps, the two African units raised.
The nature of responses during the Second T'Torld War was similar, 
but the pattern different from that of the First World ' Jar. Of those,
Rhodesian Africans who joined, the extent of the response in Ilashonaland and 
Matabeleland was more even than during the First tor Id War, 76 with the con­
spicuous Ndebele domination of 1916-18 absent. At the time this was 
attributed to Ndebele antipathy towards what was seen by them as a predominantly 
Shona enterprise since at the outset the training depot was in Salisbury and 
Shona was reported to be the main medium of instruction.77 in contrast to 
the First. World War, most districts in Southern Rhodesia produced sane recruits, 
but only a few produced what could be called 'satisfactory' results from the 
recruiters' point of view. This wider response can probably be attributed 
to improvements in communications and to more widespread labour migration, 
giving recruiters better access to African males than was possible during the 
First World War. Once again there was a considerable element of 'alien'
African recruits, especially from north of the Zambezi.78
On the whole, however, it was accepted by the authorities that the 
African response was extremely poor.79 Only 4,5%-of the African adult male
population went forward for service, compared with approximately 36% of the 
white adult male population.00
In addition to the use of various news media to recruit Africans, 
pressure was applied to the chiefs, as in 1916 and 1917, to persuade recruits 
to care forward.81 it appears that each district had a quota of recruits.82 
A new tactic was also tried in the 1940s. , Demonstration platoons of trained 
recruits were sent on recruiting tours of many districts. 83 Many hundreds 
of African people attended the demonstrations, but although they reportedly 
expressed universal enthusiasm for the R.A.R. very few recruits actually 
attested as a result of the demonstrations.84
Various Native Department officials offered explanations for this 
(to them) irrational behaviour in refusing to volunteer for the forces. 
Accusations of cowardice and idleness were once more mooted. A sharp contrast 
was drawn between dynamic, smart, eager R.A.R. recruits and 'lazy loafers' in 
the towns and kraals.85 Others suggested that parochialism, was the major 
problem. That is, this war was also a remote conflict, like the First World 
War considered essentially a white man's war with which Africans had very 
little to do. 86 Africans often went to great lengths to reinforce Native 
Department perceptions of pusillanimity, obviously hoping that this would give 
the iirpresSion that they would be useless as soldiers. Some pointed out the 
lethality of modem weapons, notably the apparently omnipotent aircraft, and 
(perhaps sensibly) declined the invitation to face than.87 Tribalism was 
seen to be: the reason for the relatively poor response from Matabeleland. 88 
There may have been seme substance in these claims and Africans took no great 
pains. to gainsay them, either because they accepted them or because it suited 
thfiin. ;■ r;
However, some of the more observant (and perhaps more honest) Native 
Commissioners saw other, more political, root causes of African apathy.
... u
The Native Department intelligence reports for 1940 and 1941 give glimpses 
of an African people who were politically disaffected from the white■■regime//'w 
in many districts and therefore. unwilling to serve in the armed forces. •
While there is little evidence of pro-Axis sympathy, Africans eh refsse were Q- 
clearly unwilling to make positive, voluntary commitments towards'the settler'
•government.89
By the outbreak of the Second World War the racial lines of the 
politico-economic structure of Southern Rhodesia were clearly defined. The 
inter-war period had seen the development of an economic system which clearly 
favoured whites and relegated Africans to the status of second class citizens 
in their own country. Recruitment in the 1940s took place against a background 
of the Land Apportionment Act, the r,aize Control Act., the introduction of de­
stocking programmes and diverse discriminatory legislation. Sane Native 
Commissioners specifically mentioned issues, like land alienation and the Maize 
Control Act as being the nub of the recruitment problem. In 1940 the Native 
Commissioner for Chipinga reported3 ’There can be little doubt that sore of the 
more intelligent /Africans/ resent, their being i: squeezed" out of the greater 
part of the high land in this area in the early days.’90 The Native Commiss­
ioner for Match© advised against the Government’s making any further large scale 
movements of people at the same time as it was trying to mobilize Africans for 
the war effort-.91 In explaining African resistance to recruiting the Native 
Commissioner for Gjwelo saw the poor response as largely attributable to the 
deleterious effect the Maize Control Act had had on local markets for African 
production.92 At a time when more Africans were becoming better educated 
and more politically aware through better communications, labour migration and 
urbanization, grievances against the settler government were more clearly 
formulated and better articulated than during Hie First World Mar.
African resistance to recruiting was not entirely limited to the passive 
form. There is evidence of agitation and rumour-mongering aimed against mili­
tary service and military construction labour by Africans. . Direct political 
agitation did not appear to be on a large scale,93but runour-mongering was ^  
rife and did adversely affect attempts to mobilize Africans for the war effort. 
Many Africans migrated (or ’deserted’ in Native Department parlance) south 
of the Limpopo or into Rechuanaland to avoid what they feared would become 
conscription. 95 An atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust surrounded approaches 
by the Government. African males feared that any involvement with the Govern­
ment would lead to conscription into the R.A.R. and this adversely affected 
drives to obtain labour for aerodrome construction. 96 Many Africans offered
money, livestock and grain to the Government war effort in what was clearly 
recognized by the: Native Department as a way out of military service.97
:v-. • The problem was never satisfactorily resolved by tine military author­
ities, and indeed could not be solved in the context of the Southern Rhodesian 
political, economic and social structure vrithout resort to conscription.
• There were instances of Africans requesting some sort of part-time military 
training for internal defence o n  the sate basis as Europeans, and even •
; conscription, blit on the whole the^positive stimuli to attract Afrli^s irS:© 
the military machine were lacking. Uhites enlisted or acCepted conscription 
from feelings of commitment and through a clear understanding that they had 
a stake in the defence of the colony and of the Empire, Africans, on the 
whole, could not feel the same way. In fact, a massive positive response by 
Africans to recruiting would have been irrational, given the context. •; "A
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.. Conversely/ the negative stimuli were also lacking. The Government 
baulked at conscription of blacks even-though seme chiefs reportedly requested 
it.98 Conscription would.have brought in large numbers of black recruits, 
but the training establishment would have had difficulty in,handling them. ; 
Consciousness of retaining a 'racial balance' (i.e. irbrie whites than blacks), 
in the armed forces of the colony made conscription undesirable in the eyes 
of the Government. The heavy pressure, in seme cases tantamount to coercion, 
which was brought to bear on Africans to 'volunteer' for paid labour on construct­
ion of military installations^ V;as not, apparently, used in recruiting for the 
armed forces. Other negative stimuli, such as massive unemployment, were not 
evident. The Rhodesian Agricultural Union complained that the raising of 
African units would adversely affect the supply of labour for the agricultural 
sector. 100 It would appear that there were no cotpelling economic reasons 
for joining the services. Wages in the armed forces were both lower and 
higher than what could be obtained in the civil sector. A domestic servant 
could earn more "than the 1/- a day (plus rations and quarters) given to 
privates in the R.A.R. Those employed on labour -hungry military construction 
projects started at 15/- a month, which was considered too lew to attract 
sufficient volunteers. 101 The basic military wage, the daily ’’King's 
. Shilling.', was considered inadequate by the people of the Mtoko district.
At that time unskilled labourers could start at 17/6d. a month, plus quarters 
and rations, on mines and farms.102 Those who were intent on entering the 
labour market would have had to balance the possible dangers and disadvantages 
of military service with its material offerings which did not greatly outstrip 
the norm in the labour market, and in seme instances were poorer. There were 
options Open to those in the labour market, of which military service was only 
one; there was no need for a man to volunteer simply because he was unemployed.
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Given the negative attitude of the broad mass of the African population, 
why then did several thousand Africans join the armed forces? The reasons 
given for the First World Uar were almost certainly partially valid for the 
second World War. The same complex of internal and external pressures would 
have cane into play. The 'glory of war' cannot be discounted as an attraction 
into the services. The soldier's life had a status appeal for many recruits,103 
and the very strong positive attitude displayed towards African soldiers by 
whites may have attracted seme. The R.A.R. was the recipient of extravagant 
praise and was given an elite status not enjoyed by other Africans. The 
military life appeals to many, if not most, people, and Africans are surely 
no exception.
There is evidence to suggest that the example of relations was 
responsible for sane recruits caning forward and that service ran in seme 
families.10^ This evidence is too narrow to talk of a 'military tradition' 
in sense families and there is at present no way of telling if the sons or 
grandsons of soldiers of the Rhodesia Native Regiment provided a disproportion­
ate percentage of recruits, or even any at all. This notwithstanding, the 
example of relations in the forces could have been a powerful stimulus to a 
potential recruit. The concept of a strong family and even tribal tradition 
of service in the white-led armed forces is mooted as being important in the 
reicnruitment of African troops in recent decades, but the evidence is not strong 
enough to allow definite conclusions regarding the Second ' or Id War period.
Official publications were full of praise for the loyalty and 
sacrificial attitude of Africans who joined the services. It would be 
difficult to deny that sane, even many, Africans joined the services out of 
feelings of patriotism or loyalty to the paternalistic regime. Africans,
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like other racial and national groups, are not homogenous in their experiences, 
attitudes and behaviour, and many may have had reason, despite the generally 
negative attitude of their peers,-to feel a' commitment to the Government and 
Crown. Earlier remarks about the disaffection of the mass of the African 
people do not exclude the possibility that some individuals reacted positively 
to patriptic appeals. Certainly during the Second T tor Id War contributions, 
to the National ! Jar Fund were considerably larger than during the First World 
War, even though 'wages and incomes had not grown considerably.105
Taking the proportionately small numbers of Africans who did offer 
themselves for service, and given the attitude of the mass of the African people 
towards the idea of military sendee under the settler regime, it would be 
pertinent to ask the question whether it is possible to characterise African 
troops as a 'deviant' group. Certainly, volunteering for military service 
was exceptional behaviour for Africans. Not only was there the settler govern­
ment to provide a poor socio-economic environment for volunteering, but the 
reaction of the bulk of Africans was present as a strong dissuasive force.
There were incidents during the Second World War to show that Africans in the 
forces often had poor relations with the civilians around them. 106 jn 
addition to periodic expressions of hostility fran their awn people Africans 
were discriminated against within the services even though they were accorded 
more status than the bulk of blacks. Their pay was markedly inferior to that 
of white servicemen; there were no commissioned Africans; in the early days 
of the war African soldiers were subjected to corporal punishnent while 
European soldiers were not. 1°"^
There seems to be no really suitable label, no neat category, for 
those Africans who joined the Southern Rhodesian armed forces. The term 
'deviants', which implies some sort of psychological aberration, is too 
strong to describe their behaviour. Similarly, the ,use of emotion-charged 
labels like 'mercenaries' or 'collaborators' is not acceptable. Inherent in 
the term 'collaborator', through usage, there is the idea of repudiation of 
one's.cwn people and conscious co-operation with a clearly recognized enemy. 
Although there was racial tension and political disaffection among Africans 
the racial battle lines were not as clearly drawn as they became with the post- 
Second World War rise of African nationalism. To call them 'mercenaries' 
does not accord with the circumstances in which the African units were raised, 
were paid and fought. Yet it is certain that during the First and Second 
World wars the accepted norm of behaviour was not to serve in the white govern­
ment's armed forces. In serving, African troops departed from this norm,.
This paper has prebed sane aspects of this exceptional behaviour, but 
it may have thrown up more questions than it has answered. However, the evidence 
which is available for the post-1890 military history and military sociology of 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia is so fragmentary that no definitive and satis­
factory answers are yet possible. TJhat does emerge fran the material available 
to date is that local social, economic and political conditions were vitally 
important in determining the shape of the African response to military 
recruiting. It is also abundantly clear that an oral history programme is 
indispensable to a fuller understanding of this historical problem. The 
'African voice' is mutecl or-totally silent in the bulk of material already > 
available. There is no body of memoirs and reminiscences like that which 
flooded from European participants in the wars almost as soon as hostilities 
ceased. It will be only through direct -contact with those who did1 serve in \ 
the armed forces that a satisfactory answer will be found to a problem which. 
has perplexed historians and a wider public, particularly Africans theimselves.j."’
for decades.108
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Appendix ~ Review of Statistical Data
It was stressed in the rain body of this paper that statistical data 
relevant to African soldiers are either unavailable to the researcher or else , 
are fragmentary, However, these fragments do enable a rough picture of the 
origins of black soldiers to be sketched.
For the First forld ’Jar there are only two collated sets of statistics 
available. The first is a register of those Africans from each district who 
were exempted frcm tax while away on active service as drivers with Southern 
Rhodesian forces in German East Africa.109 Table I shows their origins by 
district. The other is a series of returns made by Superintendents of 
Circles to the Chief Native Commissioner with respect to the performance of 
individual districts in obtaining recruits for the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment 
in 1916.**u These are also presented in Table I.
In a letter to the Secretary, Department of the Administrator, the 
Chief Native Commissioner reported that in the first recruiting canpaign the 
Native Department had obtained 428 of the 500 recruits required, the Ndebele 
being represented by over 300. H *  The rest came from the Native Police.
There is, however, sore conflicting evidence. Uriting in 1919, the then 
Commandant General, Brigadier-General A.H.M. Edwards, stated that of the 
initial body of recruits only 113 were indigenous, and those were predominantly 
Ndebele.3-*2 This does not tally with the Chief Native Commissioner's 1916 
analysis. Given the detailed breakdown provided by the Native Commissioners 
it is more probable that the Chief Native Commissioner was correct and that 
Edwards' figures were either inaccurate or misprinted. Apart from this body 
of evidence there is no record of the composition of reinforcements sent to 
1st R.N.R. frcm Southern Rhodesia during 1916 and 1917. In addition, 
information relating to the canpaign to recruit 2nd R.N.R. is virtually 
non-existent; one of the few figures available is that a mere 15 recruits 
were obtained in Mashonaland.*1^
Evidence relating to the origins of 'alien' natives is also highly 
fragmentary. In the district returns for 1916 there is seme reference to the 
origins of 'alien natives' recruited by the Native Department, Edwards was 
to report that by the end of the war the ratio of 'alien' to indigenous 
Africans in the R.N.R. was an astonishing three to one.**^ The 1911 Census 
estimated that 'alien' Africans made up only 6~7% of the total population 
of Southern Rhodesia. Although Edvards' figures may be exaggerated or 
inaccurate there were large numbers of 'aliens' in the R.N.R., for it is 
recorded that virtually the whole of one company, 'C' Company, was demobilized 
in Nyasaland as most of its members were of Yao origin. M. E. Page estimates 
that about 1 000 Africans from Nyasaland served in the R.N.R., which roughly 
tallies with Edwards' estimated ratio. 1*6 The evidence available is 
statistically too unsound to allow any absolute conclusions to be made, but 
there is enough material to come to three broad conclusions:
(i) Among indigenous Africans recruiting was far more successful: among 
the Ndebele than among the other peoples of Southern Rhodesia.. T1hile. the dis­
tricts of Matabeleland had only 32% of males on the 1917 tax register they 
provided 73% of indigenous recruits for 1st R.N.R. in 1916. r’ithin Hatabele-
land the bulk of the recruits came from three districts - Bulawayo, Bulalima- 
Mangwe and Nyamandhlovu.
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(ii) Given their small proportion of the total population recruiting was 
vastly, irore successful among 'aliehs' than among the indigenous Africans of 
Southern Rhodesia. 3y 1917 there was a clear preference on the narp of the 
military authorities for Africans from outside Southern Rhodesia,il7 so much 
so that the R.N.R. lost its essentially 'Rhodesian' character. This was u v  
accord with precedents set in the late 1890s when the Mashonaland Native Pblice 
consisted entirely of Africans from north of the Zambezi.118
(iii) There was a high proportion of districts which produced such small 
numbers of recruits as to be insignificant. The data are not full enough to 
permit a statement that any district produced no recruits at all during the 
First World War, but that many districts nroduoed a negligible number of 
recruits is clear.
For the Second World War the only distribution data available are for 
the Rhodesian African Rifles. The Rhodesian Air Askari Corps has virtually 
disappeared from a documentary point of view. The sample for the Second 
World War in Table I was constructed from apparently near-random mentions of 
names of soldiers in connection with their home districts in newsletters to and 
from the R.A.R. when it was in Burma. Only those who could be conclusively 
tied to a district were included in the sample. This represents 2,5% of the 
total number of Africans who served in the Southern Rhodesian forces, either 
in combat arms or in the Rhodesian Air Askari Labour Corps, and 8,3% of those 
who attested into and passed through the R.A.R. It may be argued that this 
sample is statistically unviable, but its apparently near-random nature does 
make it valuable. Certainly, Matabeleland lost the marked ascendancy it had 
in the 1916-18 period. Most districts in the colony produced sane recruits, 
and recruiting was very good in sane Mashonaland districts. The size of the 
sample is approximately the same as that for 1916 and the difference in the 
distribution pattern is marked.
The R.A.R. newsletters specifically mention a number of districts in 
which there had beer, a poor response to recruiting for the R.A.R. These were 
Hartley, Insiza, Selukwe, Belingwe, Zaka (Bikita), Chipinga, Melsetter,
Sebungwe and VJankie. This is reflected in the relative picture arrived at 
from tiie sample and would tend to reinforce the belief that it does give a fair 
proportionate distribution.
The contingent frcm north of the Zambezi was again considerable, 
especially from Nyasaland. Although the R.A.R. newsletters give the names 
of only fourteen soldiers from Nyasaland, nine from Northern Rhodesia and two 
from Tanganyika it would appear that there were considerably more. The 
newsletters to the R.A.R. included news information from virtually every district 
in Nyasaland and Northern Phodesia.
Although strictly outside the time period of this paper there are sane 
interesting figures relating to the early post-war R.A.R. The regiment was 
demobilized in early 1946, but reformed soon afterwards. The recruiting
pattern shown in Table II gives sane idea of the importance of 'alien' Africans 
in the R.A.R. While it cannot be argued that the post-war proportions of 
'aliens' to indigenous Africans, exactly reflects the proportions during the 
v/ar years, the R.A.R. newsletters give the impression that these proportions 
were broadly similar. Although they were an important element it is clear 
that the position in the First World War, when 'alien* Africans formed the 
bulk of the 'Rhodesia' Native Regiment, did not apply to the R.A.R.
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These data do threw some light on the widely held belief that the 
traditional recruiting ground for African troops in Southern Rhodesia and 
Rhodesia is the 'Fort Victoria district'.H^ While this nay possibly be true 
for recent years (although there is no evidence to confirm this), evidence’for 
the period up to 1945 shews that there was no marked inbalance in favour of either 
Victoria District proper or districts surrounding the town of Fort Victoria.
In fact the evidence available would seem to support the view that this area 
was least yielding of recruits. If there is any truth in the assertion that 
the bulk of African troops in the current Rhodesian armed forces come from 
the 'Fort Victoria' district then this would indicate an interesting, but 
probably coincidental historical pattern. That area was the one from which 
the B.S.A. Company's allies in the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1393,120 and many of 
those who remained neutral or actively co-operated with the Company in the 
1896-7 risings, 121 originated. In the First and Second World War periods, 
when the settler governments sought troops to fight, foreign wars, that area 
produced poor numbers for the Southern Rhodesian armed forces. If reports 
are correct, it would appear that now that internal warfare has once more 
broken out large numbers of people fran that region are once again co­
operating with the white-led armed forces.
TABLE I
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Comparison by district of nunfoers recruited in Southern Rhodesia, 1915, 1916
and 1940-1945
__ , V ' : 1915 1916 1940-5 1 .
District (Drivers for East (1st R.N.R.> (R.A.R.)
■ ' J ' \ . .Africa)
Salisbury 3 20 10
Charter 1 36 16
Darwin 0 0 9
Hartley 1 5 2
Lomgundi 0 0 23
Marandellas . 4 0 15
Hazoe 0 3 33
flrewa 0 0 26
Mtoko 1 5 8
Sebungwe 0 0 2
Victoria 0 3 1
Chibi 1 0 10
Chilimanzi 0 lO (1 local,9'alien') 21
. jGutu 0 1 15
“Ndanga • . 1 0 0
Bikita .. i 1 . ' i t . ' : 13
Omtali 1 2 21
Inyanga 1 0 5
Makbrii. 0 0 40
Melsetter 4 0 0
Bulawayo 0 133 9
Bubi 23 44 16
Bulaliiria-Mangwe 0 53 46
Gwanda 0 o : 3
Matobo 0 2 3
Nyamandhlovu 5 39 14
Wankie . 0 15 7
Gwelo 0 30(14 local, 16 'alien') 9
Belingwe 0 0 13
Insiza , 0 0 15
Unzingwane 0 3
Nyasaland -  - 14
Northern Rhodesia - — 9
Tanganyika ■■■ 2
, " TABLE 11 - V •
Recruiting into the R.A.R., 1946 and 194712? ^ : - ~ K '
Origin of recruits To 31.12.46 1.1.47 - 31.12.47 fetal
Indigenous 455 : 704 1159
N/asaland 72 84 156
Northern Rhodesia 104 • 77 . 181
Others . 2 2 yd 4
• ' h \ " 633 > 867 : lioo
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